Abstract. We prove determinacy for open length ω1 games. Going further we introduce, and prove determinacy for, a stronger class of games of length ω1, with payoff conditions involving the entire run, the club filter on ω1, and a sequence of ω1 disjoint stationary subsets of ω1. The determinacy proofs use an iterable model with a class of indiscernible Woodin cardinals, and we show that the games precisely capture the theory of the minimal model for this assumption.
The purpose of this paper is to bring determinacy to the level of games of length ω 1 .
For a set A ⊂ ω <ω1 define G open−ω1 (A) to be the following game: Players I and II alternate playing natural numbers as in Diagram 1 to create r ∈ ω ω1 . Player I wins if there exists some α < ω 1 so that r↾ α belongs to A, and otherwise We prove in this paper that these and even stronger games are determined, assuming the existence of an iterable model with a class of indiscernible Woodin cardinals. This precise large cardinal assumption had been expected, and indeed it was already known through work of Steel to be optimal, in the sense that no weaker large cardinal assumption proves the determinacy of definable open games of length ω 1 . Steel showed this by noting that the minimal iterable model with a class of indiscernible Woodin cardinals does not satisfy definable open length ω 1 determinacy. It had also been known from work of Steel and Woodin that, assuming determinacy, the Σ 1 theory of this minimal model is recursively equivalent to the universal open−ω1 Π 1 1 real, just as the Σ 1 theory of L is recursively equivalent to the universal ω Π 1 1 real. There are some intrinsic difficulties in trying to take determinacy beyond open games of length ω 1 . The definability hierarchy of descriptive set theory, generally referenced in determinacy results to exclude non-determined games, applies to sets of reals. Countable sequences of reals can be coded by reals and so the hierarchy can be translated to apply to subsets of ω <ω1 , namely to payoff sets in open games of length ω 1 . But to go beyond open one has to consider subsets of ω ω1 , and for this a mechanism for specifying the payoff is needed which goes beyond the hierarchy of definability of descriptive set theory.
We introduce such a mechanism in Section 1. The class of games we define subsumes and surpasses the class of open games of length ω 1 , but its determinacy still follows from the existence of an iterable model with a class of indiscernible Woodin cardinals. We prove the determinacy in Section 3. Let N denote the minimal iterable model with a class of indiscernible Woodin cardinals. In Sections 2 and 4 we prove that the universal real for the pointclass resulting from our length ω 1 games is recursively equivalent to the theory of indiscernible Woodin cardinals for N , just as the universal ω (<ω 2 − Π 1 1 ) real is recursively equivalent to the theory of Silver indiscernibles for L. This precise equivalence shows that our games, despite several eccentricities mentioned below, provide the correct notion of determinacy at the level of a class of indiscernible Woodin cardinals.
The main part of the paper of course is the determinacy proof in Section 3. The section assumes familiarity with parts of Neeman [4] , specifically some rough knowledge of the definitions of δ-sequences, δ-names, and pullbacks in Chapter 4 of [4] , fleeting knowledge of the end results of Chapter 5, and deeper familiarity with the game G branch of §6A, the end results about this game in §6G, and the structure of the construction in § §7B-7D. Section 2 assumes some knowledge of inner model theory.
Section 1 is a continuation of the introduction, and makes no special assumptions. The games we introduce there make reference to the club filter on ω 1 : to secure victory a player must make sure a certain condition holds on a club. This is the first instance in the study of determinacy of payoff conditions which involve quantification over the club filter, but in retrospect such involvement is very natural, fitting nicely with the comparison games of inner model theory. The reference to the club filter has a couple of consequences which are unusual in the study of determinacy: the games have runs which are lost by both players; and their payoff conditions are defined relative to sequences of ω 1 disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 . Disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 cannot be obtained in any canonical fashion, and in particular the payoff conditions in the games are not, strictly speaking, definable. But fortunately the most crucial question on each game, namely which player has a winning strategy, is independent of the particular sequence of stationary sets used. We prove this in Section 4. §1. Games. Fix a number k < ω. Given a set C ⊂ ω 1 we use (as is standard) [C] k to denote the set of increasing k-tuples from C. We use [C] <k to denote the set of increasing tuples from C of length less than k.
<k be a collection of mutually disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 , with a stationary set S a associated to each tuple a ∈ [ω 1 ]
<k .
Definition 1.1.
[ S] denotes the set:
{ α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ∈ [ω 1 ] k | (∀i < k) α i ∈ S α0,...,αi−1 }.
Let L + be the language of set theory with an added unary relation symbol r. Let ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) be a formula in L + . We write (M ; r) |= ϕ[a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ] to mean that ϕ[a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ] holds in M withṙ interpreted by r. r has to be a subset of M for this to make sense, but it need not be an element of M . k then player II wins r. If neither condition holds then both players lose.
By L ω1 [r] we mean the sets which are constructible relative to r at a countable level. Formally r is a set of pairs in ω 1 × ω. r is therefore a subset of L ω1 [r] , and the use of (L ω1 [r]; r) makes sense. Remark 1.3. Note that the two winning conditions in Definition 1.2 cannot both hold. (This uses the fact that each of the sets S a is stationary in ω 1 , and the demand in Definition 1.2 that C must be club in ω 1 .) Thus at most one player wins each run of G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). For k > 0 it may well be that neither condition in Definition 1.2 holds. So there may well be runs of G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) which are won by neither player. We say that G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) is determined if one of the players has a winning strategy. This is the stronger of two candidates for the notion of determinacy. We require not just the existence of a strategy that avoids losing, but the existence of a strategy that actually wins.
Definable open length ω 1 games (described in the introduction) can be simulated by the games of Definition 1.2 with k = 0 and ϕ in Σ 1 . The converse is also true: in the case of k = 0 and ϕ ∈ Σ 1 the game G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) is a definable open length ω 1 game. Determinacy for the games G ω1,0 ( S, ϕ) with ϕ ∈ Σ 1 is therefore precisely equivalent to determinacy for definable open length ω 1 games.
Let us next consider Definition 1.2 in the case that k = 1. One can let S be given simply by S ∅ = ω 1 in this case. A run r of G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) is then won by player I just in case that ϕ[α] holds (in (L ω1 [r]; r)) on a club of α < ω 1 ; and by player II just in case that ϕ[α] fails on a club.
It is tempting to try and phrase similar payoff conditions also in the case k > 1, and thereby remove the use of S altogether. For example, for k = 2, one can try to say that I wins r iff there exists a club C ⊂ ω 1 so that ϕ[α 0 , α 1 ] holds for all α 0 , α 1 ∈ [C] 2 ; and II wins iff there exists a club C ⊂ ω 1 so that ϕ[α 0 , α 1 ] fails for all α 0 , α 1 ∈ [C]
2 . But a definition of this kind leads to games which are trivially non-determined, for example the game (pointed out to the author by Greg Hjorth and based on a comment of Menachem Magidor) corresponding to the formula ϕ(α 0 , α 1 ) ="ṙ(α 0 + 1) =ṙ(α 1 )."
Another attempt to get rid of S involves placing a club quantifier only on one side of the payoff condition: say that I wins r iff there exists a club C ⊂ ω 1 so that (L ω1 [r] ; r) |= ϕ[α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ] for all α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ∈ [C] k ; and II wins otherwise. Let G club k (ϕ) denote the resulting game. It is consistent that the games G club k (ϕ) are all determined. In fact, assuming a sharp for a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals, it is consistent that all zero-sum games of length ω 1 on natural numbers with ordinal definable payoff are determined, see Neeman [4, 7F.14, 7F.15]. The result is due to Woodin, who derived the consistency from long game determinacy proved in [4] . The large cardinal used for the consistency proof is perhaps misleading as an indication of the strength of the games, as the game quantifier corresponding to G club 2 is strong enough to define the set of ω 1 + 1 iterable countable Mitchell-Steel premice, and such premice may have superstrong cardinals.
It is also consistent with large cardinals that the games G club k (ϕ) are not all determined. The argument for this is due to Larson [1] . Still the question remains whether large cardinals prove the determinacy of the games G 
Col(ω1,R) from large cardinals would likely have interesting consequences on Σ 2 2 absoluteness, see Woodin [8] . Returning now to the games of Definition 1.2 let us define the length ω 1 game quantifier ω1,k in the natural way: ω1,k ( S, ϕ) = True if player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ); and False otherwise.
As defined above, ω1,k takes two arguments corresponding to the two components of the payoff conditions in Definition 1.2: the argument ϕ corresponding to the definable part of the payoff, and the argument S corresponding to the nondefinable part. Assuming the existence of an iterable model with indiscernible Woodin cardinals we shall see later that ω1,k ( S, ϕ) depends only on ϕ. Specifically we shall see (in Corollary 4.2) that player I wins G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) if and only if she wins
are two collections of mutually disjoint stationary sets. This is important since S is outside the realm of descriptive set theory and cannot be picked in any canonical way. The fact that the value of ω1,k ( S, ϕ) does not depend on S allows us to remove S from the argument of the game quantifier, and obtain the following descriptive set theoretic operation:
True if player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) for some/all collections S = S a | a ∈ [ω 1 ] <k of mutually disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 ; and False otherwise.
Given a formula ϕ in L + we use ω1 (ϕ) to denote ω1,k (ϕ) where k is the number of free variables in ϕ. Given a set Φ of formulae in L + we use ω1 Φ to denote the set {ϕ ∈ Φ | ω1 (ϕ) = True}. (This set may be viewed as a real through some coding of formulae by natural numbers.) We refer to ω1 and ω1,k as length ω 1 game quantifiers. Let F consist of all formulae in L + , and let F 0,Σ1 consist of all Σ 1 formulae in L + with no free variables. We shall see finally that ω1 F 0,Σ1 is recursively equivalent to the Σ 1 theory of the minimal iterable model with a class of indiscernible Woodin cardinals, and that ω1 F is recursively equivalent to the theory of the indiscernible Woodin cardinals in this model. §2. Indiscernible Woodin cardinals. By 0 W (read "zero Woodin") we mean the minimal sound mouse M which has a top extender predicate
A mouse here is a countable premouse which is ω 1 + 1 iterable. Premice are models constructed from coherent sequences of extenders. There are two canonized meanings for "coherent," using Mitchell-Steel indexing [3] , or Jensen indexing as in Zeman [9] . The proofs in this paper work under both methods. Soundness and minimality for mice involve fine structure, and we refer the reader to [3] and [9] for more on this.
Were it not for the demand in the definition of 0 is not yet known, the main impediment being our inability to prove iterability at the level of indiscernible Woodin cardinals. Some sufficient form of iterability is widely expected to be true. But for the time being it can only be assumed. Assuming, say, ω 1 + 1 iterability for countable elementary substructures of rank initial segments of V, the existence of 0 W follows from the existence of measurable Woodin cardinals in V.
We work throughout this paper under the assumption that 0 W exists. Let M = 0 W and let E M be the top extender of M . Let κ M = crit(E M ) and let µ M be the measure on κ M induced by E M , that is the measure given by µ M (X) = 1 iff κ M ∈ j(X) where j is the ultrapower embedding by E M .
Remark 2.1. The minimality of M implies that E M is an extender with a single generator. This means that E M is generated by µ M . In fact under MitchellSteel indexing it means that the two are literally equal.
Let M ξ , j ζ,ξ | ζ ≤ ξ ∈ On be the iteration determined by setting M 0 = M ; letting M ξ+1 = Ult(M ξ , E ξ ) where E ξ = j 0,ξ (E M ); letting j ξ,ξ+1 : M ξ → M ξ+1 be the ultrapower embedding by E ξ ; defining the remaining embeddings by compositions; and taking direct limits at limit stages. Let D be the direct limit of the (class) system M ξ , j ζ,ξ | ζ ≤ ξ ∈ On . Let N = D On. D is simply the result of starting with M = 0 W and iterating its top extender through the ordinals. N is obtained by cutting D to height On.
Let κ ξ = crit(E ξ ) = j 0,ξ (κ M ). Each κ ξ is then Woodin in N -this is because κ M is Woodin in M -and {κ ξ | ξ ∈ On} is a club of indiscernibles for N . We view N and {κ ξ | ξ ∈ On} as parallels to the context of Woodin cardinals of L and its club of Silver indiscernibles.
By the theory of k Woodin indiscernibles, here denoted T k , we mean the theory of κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 in N . Since {κ ξ | ξ ∈ On} is a club of indiscernibles, T k is equal to the theory of κ ξ0 , . . . , κ ξ k−1 in N for any increasing tuple ξ 0 , . . . , ξ k−1 . Notice that a formula ψ with k free variables belongs to T k just in case that the set
k is the kth power of µ M .
Claim 2.2. The Σ 1 theory of 0 W is r.e. in ⊕ k<ω T k , and ⊕ k<ω T k is recursive in the Σ 1 theory of 0 W .
Proof sketch. The paragraph above the claim shows how to obtain T k from the Σ 1 theory of 0 W . To get the Σ 1 theory of 0 W from ⊕ k<ω T k , search for fragments of its last measure obtained by shifting indiscernibles. The argument uses the fact that every element of 0 W is definable over N from finitely many indiscernibles. The search is the reason we only get the Σ 1 theory to be r.e. in
The mouse 0 W Σ 1 -projects to ω, and its first standard parameter is ∅. The mouse is therefore canonically coded by its Σ 1 theory. In light of this and the last claim, we refer to ⊕ k<ω T k as the real coding 0 W , and when talking of 0 W as a real, for example in Corollary 2.14 below, we mean the real ⊕ k<ω T k . ⊕ k<ω T k codes 0 W in much the same way that the theory of Silver indiscernibles for L codes the minimal sound mouse with a non-trivial top extender.
Let Φ k denote the set of formulae, in the language L + of Section 1, which have at most k free variables. We plan to show that T k is recursive in ω1 Φ k . To do this we must reduce the question of membership in T k to the question of winning length ω 1 games of the kind defined in Section 1, with payoff formula in Φ k .
Following the notation of Section 1 fix a collection S = S a | a ∈ [ω 1 ] <k of mutually disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 .
Fix a formula ψ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ). We define below a length ω 1 game G ψ , of the format of Definition 1.2 with payoff in Φ k . We shall show later that player I has a winning strategy in G ψ precisely when ψ belongs to T k . The association ψ → G ψ will then allow us to reduce T k to ω1 Φ k .
Description of G ψ . Players I and II use the first ω moves to play reals coding sound countable pre-mice P and Q respectively. P and Q must Σ 1 -project to ω and must moreover satisfy the following conditions:
1. P must have a top extender E P with crit(E P ) a Woodin cardinal in P .
There must be no earlier extender in P with a critical point which is Woodin in the level at which the extender is added. 2. Similarly Q must have a top extender E Q with crit(E Q ) Woodin in Q, and there must be no earlier extender in Q with a critical point which is Woodin in the level at which the extender is added. 3. Let κ P = crit(E P ) and let µ P be the measure on κ P induced by E P . The set of α 0 , . . . ,
k measure 1, where (µ P ) k denotes the kth power of µ P .
4. Let κ Q = crit(E Q ) and let µ Q be the measure on κ Q induced by E Q . The set of α 0 , . . . ,
Conditions (1) and (3) are placed on player I. Conditions (2) and (4) are placed on player II. For the rest of the game the players compare P and Q. More precisely they construct maximal non-overlapping iteration trees U and V on P and Q respectively, subject to the condition that for each ξ, F U ξ and F V ξ are given by the least disagreement between P ξ and Q ξ . (See [3] or [9] for the definition of fine structural iteration trees, and examples of comparisons. P ξ and F U ξ here stand for the models and extenders of U. Similarly Q ξ and F V ξ stand for the models and extenders of V. Notice that conditions (1)- (4) imply that no iterate of P can agree with an iterate of Q. So P ξ and Q ξ must indeed disagree.) This condition determines the trees, modulo a choice of branches [0, γ] U and [0, γ] V for limit γ. We ask player I to pick the branches [0, γ] U used on the P side, and ask player II to pick the branches [0, γ] V used on the Q side.
If ever a stage ξ < ω 1 is reached so that either P ξ or Q ξ is illfounded, then the game ends. If P ξ is illfounded then II wins. Otherwise (Q ξ is illfounded and) I wins.
Suppose now that both players maintain wellfoundedness for ω 1 stages, producing iteration trees U and V of length ω 1 . Let N end be the lined-up part of the comparison. More precisely this is ξ<ω1 P ξ lh(
k then player I wins. If there exists a club
k then player II wins. Note that at most one of these conditions holds. If both conditions fail then both players lose.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose that ψ ∈ T k . Then player I has a winning strategy in G ψ .
Proof. Let Γ be an ω 1 + 1 iteration strategy for 0 W . We describe how to play for I in G ψ , and win. Start by playing (a real coding) P = 0 W . 0 W trivially satisfies condition (1) in the definition of G ψ . The assumption that ψ ∈ T k implies that it also satisfies condition (3) .
Let the opponent play Q. Now play through the comparison of P and Q by letting the opponent pick branches for V on the Q side, and using Γ to pick branches for U on the P side.
Since Γ is an iteration strategy for P = 0 W , this method guarantees that all the models of U are wellfounded. If an illfoundedness is reached it can only be on the Q side, and must therefore result in victory for I, as required.
Suppose then that no illfoundedness is reached, so that the game ends with two iteration trees U and V on P and Q respectively, of length ω 1 .
Γ is an ω 1 + 1 iteration strategy for P = 0 W . We may therefore apply it to the tree U. Let b be the cofinal branch through U given by Γ. Let P ω1 be the direct limit of the models of U along b, and let j ζ,ω1 : P ζ → P ω1 , for sufficiently large ζ ∈ b, be the direct limit embeddings.
A standard argument produces some ξ 0 ∈ b, some τ ∈ P ξ0 , and some C ⊂ ω 1 so that:
(i) There are no truncations on b above ξ 0 ;
(ii) C is club in ω 1 and contained in b − ξ 0 ; and (iii) j ξ0,α (τ ) = α for every α ∈ C. It follows from condition (iii) that crit(j α,ω1 ) ≤ α for each α ∈ C. By thinning C if needed we may in fact make sure that: (iv) crit(j α,ω1 ) = α for every α ∈ C. From conditions (iii) and (iv) it follows easily that j α,ω1 (α) = ω 1 for each α ∈ C, so j ξ0,ω1 (τ ) = ω 1 .
Claim 2.4. There is no cofinal branch through V.
Proof. U and V are length ω 1 trees generated through a comparison of two countable pre-mice. Cofinal branches through both trees would allow completing the standard comparison argument to derive a contradiction. (The standard argument then uses the contradiction to concludes that the comparison must have terminated before reaching ω 1 .) So at least one of the trees has no cofinal branch. Since U has a cofinal branch, namely b, it must be that V does not. ⊣ Claim 2.5. ω 1 is Woodin in P ω1 .
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that ω 1 is not Woodin in P ω1 . Let η ∈ P ω1 be least so that η ≥ ω 1 and ω 1 fails to be Woodin in P ω1 η + 1. Let P * = P ω1 η + 1.
Let θ be some regular cardinal greater than ω 1 . Let H be a countable Skolem hull of V θ , with all relevant objects, including U, V, C, ξ 0 , and τ , thrown into H. LetH be the transitive collapse of H and let π :H → H be the anticollapse embedding.
Let α =H ∩ ω 1 . It's easy to check that α belongs to C, and hence to b. It's also easy to check that π
In other words, α, C ∩ α, b ∩ α, and P α belong toH, and are sent by π to ω 1 , C, b, and P ω1 respectively. Letη = π −1 (η). Using the definition of η, the elementarity of π, and the fact that π(P α ) = P ω1 it's easy to see thatη is least so thatη ≥ α and α fails to be Woodin in P α η + 1. Note that in particular P α η projects to α.
The fact that ξ 0 was thrown into H implies that α > ξ 0 . It follows that there are no truncations on b above α. From this, the fact that P α η projects to α, and the fact that crit(j α,ω1 ) = α, it follows that the least disagreement between P α and Q α must be aboveη. So P α η + 1 is an initial segment of Q α . LetP * = π −1 (P * ). Notice thatP * is then equal to P α η + 1. The arguments of the preceding paragraphs show that: (v)P * |="α is not a Woodin cardinal"; and (vi)P * is an initial segment of Q α .
Note thatV is then equal to V↾ α. Let g be Col(ω, α)-generic overH. Working insideH[g] let R be the tree of attempts to create a cofinal branch c throughV with the property thatP * is an initial segment of the direct limit along c. Such a tree can be defined using the fact thatP * and V are countable inH [g] .
Notice that in V there exists a branch through R: the branch [0, α] V leads to the direct limit Q α , andP * is an initial segment of this direct limit by condition (vi). Using absoluteness it follows that a branch through R must exist also in H[g]. In other wordsH[g] |="there exists a branch c, cofinal inV, and such that P * is an initial segment of the direct limit along c." There can only be one such branch c, since otherwise α would be Woodin with respect to all functions in P * and this would contradict condition (v). The uniqueness of c inH[g] implies that c must in fact exist already inH. Thus we conclude that: (vii)H |="there exists a cofinal branch throughV." But now using the elementarity of π it follows that (in H) there exists a cofinal branch through π(V) = V. This contradicts Claim 2.4. ⊣ Remark 2.6. Claim 2.5 is part of an argument due to John Steel, showing that length ω 1 iterability (as opposed to the stronger length ω 1 + 1 iterability) suffices for identifying mice below 0 W . Steel's result is rephrased in this paper as Theorem 2.15 below.
For each α ∈ C let ξ(α) ≥ α be such that the successor of α in the branch b is ξ(α) + 1. Notice then that ξ(α) + 1 belongs to b, that P ξ(α)+1 = Ult(P α , F U ξ(α) ), and that j α,ξ(α)+1 is the ultrapower embedding of
is the first extender used for the embedding j α,ω1 . The embedding has critical point α by condition (iv). So F U ξ(α) must have critical point α. Let E P denote the top extender predicate of P = 0 W . Let κ P = crit(E P ) and let µ P be the measure on κ P induced by E P . For each α ∈ C let µ α = j 0,α (µ P ).
Proof. From Claim 2.5 it follows that α is Woodin in P α . This in turn implies that α is Woodin in P ξ(α) . We know that crit(F U ξ(α) ) is equal to α. F U ξ(α) is thus an extender on the sequence of P ξ(α) , with Woodin critical point. In P = 0 W only the top extender, namely E P , has this property. The claim follows. ⊣ Claim 2.8. α belongs to the branch of U leading to ξ(α), and
it follows that α belongs to the range of j 0,ξ(α) . This implies that no extenders which overlap α are used on the branch of U leading to ξ(α). (An extender F is said to overlap α if α ∈ [crit(F ), lh(F )). Notice that in this case, at least for extenders below superstrong, α cannot belong to the range of the ultrapower embedding by F .)
The fact that crit(j α,ω1 ) = α implies that extenders applied to models before P α in U must have critical point below α, and extenders F U ζ for ζ ≥ α must have length above α. The current claim follows easily from these observations and the conclusion of the last paragraph. ⊣ Claim 2.9. j 0,ω1 (κ P ) = ω 1 .
Proof. By Claim 2.7, j 0,ξ(α) (κ P ) = α for each α ∈ C. Using Claim 2.8 it follows that j 0,α (κ P ) = α. Composing this with the fact that j α,ω1 (α) = ω 1 we get j 0,ω1 (κ P ) = ω 1 . ⊣ Claim 2.10. Let α ∈ C and let X ∈ P α be a subset of j 0,α (κ P ). Suppose that X has j 0,α (µ P ) measure 1. Then α ∈ j α,ω1 (X).
Proof. Using Claim 2.8 and the fact that X has j 0,α (µ P ) measure 1 we see that j α,ξ(α) (X) has j 0,ξ(α) (µ P ) measure 1. From this and Claim 2.7 it follows that α belongs to the image of X under the ultrapower embedding by F U ξ(α) , and so α belongs to j α,ξ(α)+1 (X). Now ξ(α) + 1 belongs to the branch b, and
Proof. The initial assumption of Lemma 2.3 is such that ψ belongs to
k measure 1. The corollary follows from this using Claim 2.9 and most importantly Claim 2.10. ⊣ Corollary 2.11 establishes that player I wins the run of G ψ that we constructed above. (In fact the corollary establishes more than the payoff condition. It establishes that ψ[α 0 , . . . ,
The construction can therefore be formalized to give a winning strategy for player I in G ψ . ⊣ (Lemma 2.3.) An argument similar to that of Lemma 2.3 proves the following, dual lemma:
Equipped with the definition of G ψ and the lemmas above we can begin to characterize 0 W in terms of the game quantifier of Section 1:
Proof. The game G ψ above clearly has the format of Definition 1.2, with payoff given by a formula in Φ k . In fact it's clear that we can fix a recursive map ψ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) → ϕ ψ ∈ Φ k so that for each formula ψ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) the game G ψ is precisely equal to the game G ω1,k ( S, ϕ ψ ) of Definition 1.2. By Lemmas 2.3 and 2.12, ψ ∈ T k iff player I has a winning strategy in
We shall see later that the reverse direction, that ⊕ k<ω ( ω1 Φ k ) is recursive in 0 W , is also true. Thus the situation we obtain here for 0 W and games of length ω 1 precisely parallels the situation in the case of 0 ♯ and length ω games with [2] . The analogy can be strengthened further. Recall that N , defined earlier in the section, is the model obtained by iterating the top extender of 0 W through the ordinals, and cutting the direct limit to height On. N is a parallel of L (obtained by iterating 0 ♯ through the ordinals and cutting the direct limit to height On) to the context of indiscernible Woodin cardinals. The following result parallels the fact that the Σ 1 theory of L is a Σ 1 2 real, or in other words a ω Π 1 1 real. Theorem 2.15 (Steel) . Let T Σ1 be the Σ 1 theory of N . Let Φ Σ1 be the set of
Notice that both T Σ1 and Φ Σ1 only involve sentences, that is formulae with 0 free variables. We noted in Section 1 that the games G ω1,0 ( S, ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Φ Σ1 are simply the definable open length ω 1 games. Theorem 2.15 thus connects the open length ω 1 game quantifier to the Σ 1 theory of the minimal class model with indiscernible Woodin cardinals.
Proof of Theorem 2.15. For a Σ 1 sentence ψ, the game G ψ defined earlier in the section can be revised to have the format of a game G ω1,0 (ϕ) with ϕ ∈ Φ Σ1 . The revision involves joining the payoff conditions of the cases of illfoundedness and wellfoundedness. More precisely, revise G ψ to say that player I wins a run consisting of P , Q, U, and V just in case that there exists some η < ω 1 so that either:
• (N end η) |= ψ; or else • There is ξ ≤ η so that P ξ and all previous models on U are wellfounded but Q ξ is illfounded. If such an η < ω 1 does not exist then II wins.
It is clear that the revised G ψ has the format of Definition 1.2 with payoff given by a Σ 1 sentence. More precisely there is a recursive map ψ → ϕ ψ ∈ Φ Σ1 so that for every Σ 1 sentence ψ, the revised game G ψ is precisely equal to G ω1,0 ( S, ϕ ψ ). Lemmas 2.3 and 2.12 easily adapt to the revised game, showing that ψ ∈ T Σ1 iff player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,0 ( S, ϕ ψ ). The theorem follows. ⊣ We shall see later that the reverse direction to Theorem 2.15, that ω1 Φ Σ1 is recursive in T Σ1 , is also true. Again this parallels the situation at the level of 0 ♯ and length ω games, since ω Π 1 1 statements are Σ 1 over L by Martin [2] . Theorem 2.16 (Steel) . 0
W is not a model of determinacy for definable open length ω 1 games, that is for games G ω1,0 ( S, ϕ) with ϕ ∈ Φ Σ1 .
Proof. 0
W and N have the same reals and the same sets of reals. We may therefore prove the theorem for N instead of 0 W . Let < c denote the order of constructibility on reals in N . x < c y is Σ 1 over N . Relativizing the proof of Theorem 2.15 to reals, and running it inside N , we see that "< c belongs to the pointclass open−ω1 Π By an iteration tree on M, µ M we mean the natural modification of the standard definition, to allow the use of µ M and its images, in addition to the use of internal extenders. Iterability in condition (A4) is meant with respect to this liberalized notion.
The existence of a pair M, µ M satisfying conditions (A1)-(A4) follows from the existence of 0
, µ W satisfies these conditions. Essentially conditions (A1)-(A4) spell out the properties of 0 W (or more precisely the ultrapower of 0 W by its top extender) which we shall need in the construction below. Notice that none of these properties involves the fine structure of 0 W . So a pair M, µ M satisfying conditions (A1)-(A4) can be obtained from any countable iterable model with, e.g., a measurable Woodin cardinal.
<k of mutually disjoint subsets of ω 1 . (There is no need to assume that these sets are stationary.) Fix a formula ϕ in the language L + of Section 1, with k free variables. We work to prove that G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) is determined.
Remark 3.1. To avoid some inconveniences in the proof let us assume that k ≥ 1. We shall derive the case k = 0 from the case k = 1 later on.
Remark 3.2. Without loss of generality we may assume that a∈[ω1] <k S a is equal to ω 1 . This can always be arranged by increasing S ∅ , and an increase of this kind only serves to make the game G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) more demanding for both players.
We work throughout with the terminology of Neeman [4] . More specifically we need the definitions in Chapter 4 of [4] , the end results in Chapters 5 and 6, and some of the definitions and intermediary claims in Chapter 7. We briefly and very informally introduce key points of the definitions and results below, as they become relevant, and give more specific references.
An annotated position t, defined in [4, §4A] , is a sequence consisting of reals, and auxiliary objects which come up during the determinacy proofs. We use z(t) to denote the real part of t, defined precisely in [4, 4A.21] . z(t) is a sequence of reals. We use r(t) to denote the concatenation of the reals in z(t). More precisely, if z = z ξ | ξ < lh( z) say, then r(t) is the sequence r defined by r(ω · ξ + n) = z ξ (n) for ξ < lh( z) and n < ω. r(t) is then a sequence of natural numbers of length ω · lh( z(t)), literally the concatenation of z. We refer to r(t) as the concatenated real part of t.
Let θ = crit(µ M ). θ is a Woodin cardinal of M by condition (A3). Using this and the fact that θ is the critical point of a measure over M it follows that θ is also a limit of Woodin cardinals of M . So θ is a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals in M .
Let W θ be the poset defined in [4, §4B] . This is a version of Woodin's extender algebra on identities in M θ, restricted to the use of extenders which overlap Woodin cardinals, and designed specifically so that the generic object is an annotated position of length θ (rather than merely its real part). A θ-sequence, defined precisely in [4, 4D.1], is an annotated position of length θ which is generic for W θ , meaning that it satisfies all the extender axioms of the algebra.
Let α k denote θ. For the sake of Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 fix some tuple
Definition 3.3. For expository simplicity fix some G which is
r(t) in Definition 3.3 is the concatenated real part of t mentioned above. In the case of a θ-sequence t, where θ is a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals, r(t) has length precisely θ. Definition 3.3 sets our goal in the game G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). We want to play the game so that the set of tuples α 0 , . . . , α k−1 for which we enter interpretations
The precise definition of the pullback operation is given in [4, § §4C,4D]. Y i (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ) is a name for a set of α i -sequences. Roughly speaking the pullback operation is defined in such a way thatẎ i names the set of sequences from which player I can play to enter an interpretation of a shift ofẎ i+1 . The precise meaning of shift here is given by the definitions of the games G branch in [4, §6A] . These games set the rules for the construction of an iteration map by whichẎ i+1 is shifted.
Remember that we are working with a fixed formula ϕ in L + , and aiming to prove that G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) is determined. The definitions above are made with reference to ϕ; the formula comes in through Definition 3.3. We make the dependence more explicit in the following definition:
The formula ϕ ini is defined precisely in [4, Definition 5G.2]. Roughly speaking, if ϕ ini [α 0 ,Ẏ 0 (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 )] holds in M then player I has a strategy to enter an interpretation of a shift ofẎ 0 (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ).
Let us now combine Definitions 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5: If α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ∈ U (ϕ) then player I has a strategy to reach an annotated position t * 0 which enters an interpretation of a shift ofẎ 0 (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ). From t * 0 player I then has a strategy to reach an annotated position t * Continuing this way, player I then has a strategy from t * 1 to enter a shift ofẎ 2 , etc., until eventually reaching t * k which belongs to a shift ofẎ k (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ). Now Definition 3.3 is such that membership in a shift ofẎ k (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ) secures the instance of the payoff formula ϕ corresponding to the appropriate shift of α 0 , . . . , α k−1 .
Thus, assuming that α 0 , . . . , α k−1 belongs to U (ϕ), we intuitively expect player I to be able to play to secure an instance of the payoff formula ϕ, corresponding to a shift of α 0 , . . . , α k−1 .
If many tuples α 0 , . . . , α k−1 belong to U (ϕ) then we intuitively expect player I to be able to secure many instances of the payoff formula ϕ. If U (ϕ) is so large that it has (µ M )
k measure 1 then we may even expect player I to secure enough instances of ϕ so as to win G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). This intuitive expectation is realized by the following lemma:
k is the kth power of µ M . Then player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ).
We prove the lemma below. The proof relies heavily on the precise meaning of "entering a shift." The shifts are created according to the rules of the games G branch , which the reader may find in [4, §6A] . Theorem 6G.1 of [4] formalizes the fact that from an annotated position t which belongs to a pullback ofẎ , player I can win to enter a shift ofẎ . Precisely, the theorem produces a strategy for player I in an instance of G branch . In proving Lemma 3.6 we combine these strategies to form a strategy for player I in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). The reader can survive without knowledge of how the strategies in G branch are produced in [4, Chapter 6 ]. But it is important to know the underlying game, described in [4, 6A] , and it is helpful to know how the strategies can be used, for example in Chapter 7 of [4] .
Remark 3.7. Notice that the function ϕ → U (ϕ) is definable over M using θ as a parameter. The definition of the function is simply the combination of Definitions 3.3 through 3.5, the definition from θ of W θ in [4, §4B] , and the definition of the pullback operation in [4, § §4C,4D]. All can be phrased over M , and only θ is needed as a parameter. For future reference fix a formula χ witnessing the definability of ϕ → U (ϕ). More precisely fix a formula χ so that (for all M ) M |= χ[θ, ϕ, X] iff X = U (ϕ) where U (ϕ) is given by Definitions 3.3 through 3.5 on M and θ.
We prove Lemma 3.6 below. But first let us find an equivalent formulation to the statement that
≤k we define below a θ-nameẎ (a) ∈ M . We work by induction on the length of a, downward from length k to length 0. The definition results in a map a →Ẏ (a) (a ∈ [θ] ≤k ), which we denoteẎ . We make sure as we proceed that the map belongs to M .
In the case of a tuple a = α 0 , . . . , α k−1 of length k setẎ (a) equal to the nameẎ k (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ) of Definition 3.3. This defines the mapẎ
belongs to M since Definition 3.3 is made inside M . Let now l < k, and suppose that the mapẎ ↾ [θ] l+1 is known and belongs to M . Let M * = Ult(M, µ M ) and let j : M → M * be the ultrapower embedding. ≤k , and show that the map belongs to M . We record some properties of the definition, crucial for future use, in Claim 3.8 below. Then in Claim 3.9 we connect the definition ofẎ to the statement "U (ϕ) has (µ M ) k measure 1" of Lemma 3.6.
≤k . Let t belong to an interpretation ofẎ (a).
is the ultrapower embedding of M by µ M , and the pullback is computed inside
Proof. Let M n , j n,m | n ≤ m ≤ k be the finite iteration defined by setting M 0 = M ; setting M n+1 = Ult(M n , j 0,n (µ M )) and letting j n,n+1 : M n → M n+1 be the ultrapower embedding by j 0,n (µ M ); and defining the remaining embeddings j n,m by composition. Let θ n = j 0,n (θ) for each n ≤ k.
The agreement in condition (A2) above implies that for each n ≤ k, M n and M k agree to the first strongly inaccessible cardinal of M n above θ n . This is more than enough to make sure that pullbacks of θ n -names are absolute between M n and M k . The absoluteness follows from the local nature of the pullback operation; the pullback of a δ-name in a model N only involves objects at ranks approximately δ. (More precisely it involves elements up to the least pair of local indiscernibles, see [4, Definition 1A .15], of N above δ.)
Notice that M k is simply equal to the ultrapower of
k measure 1. It follows that θ 0 , . . . , θ k−1 belongs to j 0,k (U (ϕ)), and by Definition 3.5 this means that M k satisfies the formula
It's easy to check, directly from Definition 3.4, the definition of the mapẎ , and the absoluteness of pullbacks noted above,
. . ] involves pullbacks of δ-names for δ ≤ θ. Using the absoluteness of pullbacks noted above it follows that ϕ ini is absolute between M and M k . So M satisfies ϕ ini [θ,Ẏ (∅)], as required. ⊣ Remark 3.10. We say that a W θ -nameḂ is symmetric if for any two generics G 1 and G 2 for W θ over M , and for any x which belongs to
Notice that the condition of symmetry holds forẎ (a). If lh(a) = k this follows from the fact that Definition 3.3 decides the matter of the membership of t iṅ Y (a) [G] with no reference to G or even to M [G], but just with reference to t. If lh(a) < k then the symmetry ofẎ (a) follows from the symmetry of pullbacks to Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals. These pullbacks are ultimately given by an application of case 2 in [4, §4D (2)]. The conditions there refer to a formula ϕ suc , defined in [4, §4C (2)]. ϕ suc is absolute between generic extensions of M by [4, Claim 4C.10], and using this it's easy to see that case 2 in [4, §4D(2)] defines a symmetric name.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Let us now begin the proof of Lemma 3.6. Fix an iteration strategy Γ for M, µ M . Fix an imaginary opponent willing to play for II in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). We describe how to play against the opponent, and win.
The description takes the form of a construction. We work to construct:
≤k ; (B) A regular tot U on M, µ M , of length ω 1 + 0.2, consistent with Γ; and
The sequence in condition (C) consists of a play r in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ), obtained from y in the manner of Definition 3.11 below, and auxiliary moves, in w. The "tot," or tree of trees, in condition (B) is an iteration tree making individual real moves in the play generic over collapses of Woodin cardinals which are not limits of Woodin cardinals, and making the play itself, plus the auxiliary information, generic for the extender algebra at Woodin limits of Woodin cardinals. (See [4, §7B] for the definitions relevant to these conditions. By a tot on M, µ M we mean the natural modification of the definition of [4, §7B] , to allow the use of µ M and its images, in addition to the use of internal extenders.) The sequence in condition (A) delineates our progress toward winning G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). We intend to make sure that, if a α is a tuple of length k, then (L ω1 [r]; r) |= ϕ[â α ], attaining an instance of our goal in the game. (a →â is a shift which is the identity on a club.) We then intend to prove that there is a club C so that the set
, thereby securing our victory in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). We will use S during the construction to guide the sequence α → a α and the tree structure of U, so that at the end the club C can be obtained very directly from a branch of length ω 1 through U.
Definition 3.11. Let z = y ζ | ζ < ω 1 and ζ is either zero or a successor ordinal . Define r ∈ ω ω1 by r(ω · ξ + n) = y −1+ξ+1 (n) for ξ < ω 1 and n < ω. Both z and r are defined with reference to the construction, specifically with reference to the objects of condition (C).
z is the part of the U-sequence w, y which involves real numbers. r is simply the concatenation of the reals in z. Notice that r, being an element of ω ω1 , is a run of G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). We let the imaginary opponent contribute the odd half of r during the construction. All the other elements involved with conditions (A)-(C), including the even half of r, we construct ourselves. We shall verify at the end that r is won by player I in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ).
When working with U and w, y we regularly use the notation of [4, §7B] . U itself consists of a tree order U on ω 1 + 1; models M ξ for ξ ≤ ω 1 and Q ξ for ξ < ω 1 ; embeddings j ζ,ξ : M ζ → M ξ for ζ U ξ commuting in the natural way; length ω iteration trees T ξ on M ξ for ξ < ω 1 ; infinite branches b ξ through these trees; and objects E ξ for ξ < ω 1 which may either be extenders of Q ξ or be equal to "undefined." The precise relationship between these objects is explained in conditions (S), (U), and (L) of [4, §7B] .
The objects in U give rise to ordinals δ ξ+1 and λ ξ defined in [4, §7B] and characterized specifically in Claims 7B.5 through 7B.13 of [4] . U and the sequence w, y of (C) above together give rise to annotated positions t η (η ≤ ω 1 ) in the manner of [4, Definition 7B.14]. They also give rise to strands, in the manner of [4, Definition 7B.17]. We need actually a generalization of this last notion, which we define next.
For the purpose of Definition 3.12 below fix some η ≤ ω 1 . By [0, η] U we mean the branch of U leading to η, with η itself included. More precisely this is the set {ζ | (ζ U η) ∨ (ζ = η)}.
Again for the purpose of Definition 3.12 let β + 1 be the order type of
The notation above follows that leading to Definition 7B.17 of [4] , which defines the strand (of U and w, y ) leading to η to be the sequence
Intuitively this is the part of U and w, y which corresponds to the branch of U leading to η. It is observed following Definition 7B.17 of [4] that P η has the format of a position of length β in the game G branch of [4, §6A] , and this connection is key to the later constructions in [4, § §7C,7D].
. By the strand (of U and w, y ) leading from ν to η we mean the sequence
Definition 3.12 generalizes Definition 7B.17 of [4] . The strand leading to η in the sense of [4, 7B.17 ] is the same as the strand leading from 0 to η in the sense of Definition 3.12.
Notice that this more general definition retains the connection to G branch . The strand leading from ν to η has the format of a position in an instance of G branch , more specifically the instance appearing in condition (4) below.
We need one more notational ingredient before we can begin to be more specific on the construction of the objects in conditions (A)-(C) above.
For each α < ω 1 letα denote rdm(t α ). (This definition is made with reference to U, or at least U↾ α + 0.2, which is needed to give rise to t α .) For each tuple
≤k letâ denote the tuple α 0 , . . . ,α l−1 .
Remark 3.13. Note that α = rdm(t α ) on a club, and thereforeα = α on a club. These equalities follow from the fact that rdm(t α ) | α < ω 1 is a continuous sequence of countable ordinals, monotone increasing, and strictly increasing at successors in the sense that rdm(t α ) < rdm(t β ) for α < β with α a successor.
For each a ∈ [ω 1 ] ≤k of length greater than 0 let ν(a) = max(a) + 1. Let ν(∅) = 0.
Let A denote the set of a ∈ [ω 1 ] ≤k so that player I has a winning strategy in the game G branch (M ν(a) , t ν(a) , j 0,ν(a) (θ) )(j 0,ν(a) (Ẏ )(â)). We refer the reader to [4, §6A] for the definition of G branch . Here we use the instance of G branch which corresponds to starting from the model M ν(a) of U and from the annotated position t ν(a) , and aiming to enter a shift of j 0,ν(a) (Ẏ )(â). The target j 0,ν(a) (Ẏ )(â) is the name associated toâ by the shift to M ν(a) of the mapẎ defined in connection with Claims 3.8 and 3.9 above.
A is defined with reference to U and w, y which we have yet to construct. But regardless of the construction we have M 0 = M (this is because U is a tot on M, µ M ) and t 0 = ∅, or in other words t 0 equal to the empty annotated position of length 0. The question of membership of a = ∅ in A can therefore be considered already now, regardless of the construction. The following claim shows that ∅ ∈ A. The claim makes a crucial use of the initial assumption in Lemma 3.6. For each a which belongs to A fix some winning strategy Σ branch (a) for player I in G branch (M ν(a) , t ν(a) , j 0,ν(a) (θ))(j 0,ν(a) (Ẏ )(â)). Given a non-terminal position P in G branch (M ν(a) , t ν(a) , j 0,ν(a) (θ))(j 0,ν(a) (Ẏ )(â)) let Σ branch (a)[P ] be the restriction of Σ branch (a) to the mega-round which precisely follows P , that is to mega-round lh(P ) following the position P .
We intend to make sure that the following conditions hold for each α < ω 1 (except for external limit α, which we shall define and discuss later):
1. The tuple a α belongs to A; 2. All the ordinals inâ α are smaller than j 0,ν(aα) (θ); 3. ν(a α ) belongs to [0, α] U ; and 4. The strand P ν(aα),α is a legal position in the game
(where ν abbreviates ν(a α )), non-terminal in this game, and played according to Σ branch (a α ). Condition (4) is the most important one. The other conditions are simply needed to make sense of condition (4). Condition (1) is needed to make Σ branch (a α ) meaningful, condition (2) is needed to make j 0,ν (Ẏ )(â α ) meaningful, and condition (3) is needed to make P ν,η meaningful.
We begin the construction by setting a 0 = ∅ (as we must since a 0 has to belong to [0] ≤k ). Condition (1) then holds for α = 0 by Claim 3.14. Condition (2) holds trivially sinceâ 0 = ∅. Condition (3) holds trivially since ν(a 0 ) = 0. Condition (4) also holds trivially, since P 0,0 is the empty position.
We then construct in stages η < ω 1 , starting with η = 0. At the start of a successor (or zero
≤k , and enough to determine strands leading to η. Thus at the start of a successor (or zero) stage η we have enough information to determine the truth value of conditions (1)- (4) for α ≤ η. Inductively we know that these conditions hold true.
Successor and zero stages. Conditions (1), (3), and (4) for α = η tell us that a = a η belongs to A so that Σ branch (a) is defined; that ν = ν(a η ) belongs to [0, η] U so that P ν,η is defined; and that P ν,η is legal and non-terminal in G branch (M ν , t ν , j 0,ν (θ))(j 0,ν (Ẏ )(â)), and played according to Σ branch (a), so that Σ branch (a)[P ν,η ] is defined.
Σ branch (a)[P ν,η ], the iteration strategy Γ, and the imaginary opponent, combine to produce w η , y η , T η , and b η according to rules (S1)-(S4) of G branch in [4, §6A] . T η and b η determine U↾ η + 1, with a final model Q η equal to the direct limit of the models of T η along b η . Working over Q η let t † η = t η − −, w η , y η . This is the annotated position over Q η obtained by extending t η of [4, Definition 7B.14] with the moves w η and y η produced above.
Case 1. If t †
η is obstruction free over Q η . In this case let U↾ η + 1.2 be the extension of U↾ η+1 determined by the assignment E η ="undefined." Let a η+1 = a (namely to a η ). An argument similar to that of [4, Lemma 7C.7] shows that P ν,η+1 is then legal in G branch (M ν , t ν , j 0,ν (θ))(j 0,ν (Ẏ )(â)), non-terminal, and played according to Σ branch (a). This secures condition (4) for η + 1. Conditions (1) and (2) for η+1 follow trivially from the same condition for η, since a η+1 = a η through the assignment above. Condition (3) for η + 1 also follows trivially since the extension of U↾ η made above is such that η U η + 1.
⊣ (Case 1.)
η is obstructed over Q η . An argument similar to that of [4, Claim 7C.6] shows that t † η is I-acceptably obstructed over Q η . (The key point is that annotated positions which are obstructed but not I-acceptably obstructed cause a loss for player I in G branch , and therefore cannot occur in plays according to Σ branch (a) which is winning for I.) Let E, σ then be a I-acceptable obstruction for t † η over Q η . crit(E) is a limit of Woodin cardinals in Q η but not itself Woodin. By [4, Claim 7B.6] there exists some γ ≤ η so that γ is a standard limit in U and crit(E) is equal to λ γ . (λ γ is one of the objects defined in [4, §7B]. Our reasoning above is similar to that in [4, §7C(2)].)
Let U↾ η + 1.2 be the extension of U↾ η + 1 determined by:
(a) E η = E; and (b) The U -predecessor of η + 1 is γ.
These assignments are similar to the ones made in [4, §7C(2)].
Let a * = a γ and let ν * = ν(a γ ). Make the assignment:
(c) a η+1 = a * (equal to a γ that is).
Conditions (1)-(3) for η + 1 then follow from the same conditions for γ. An argument similar to that of [4, Lemma 7C.13] shows that P ν * ,η+1 is legal in G branch (M ν * , t ν * , j 0,ν * (θ))(j 0,ν * (Ẏ )(â * )), non-terminal, and played according to Σ branch (a * ), thereby securing condition (4) for η + 1. Note that P η+1 in the current case extends P γ , rather than P η , and this is why we pass to a * = a γ and ν * = ν(a γ ) above. The fact that P η+1 extends P γ is connected to the leap taken in the proof of [4, Lemma 7C.13].
⊣ (Case 2.)
The two cases above complete the construction in stage η in the case that η is a successor or zero, and put us in a position to pass to stage η + 1.
⊣ (Successor and zero stages.)
At the start of a limit stage η we have U↾ η, the sequences w↾ η and y↾ η, and the association α → a α for α < η. We know inductively that conditions (1)- (4) hold true for all α < η.
Let c η be the cofinal branch through U↾ η picked by the iteration strategy Γ. Let U↾ η + 0.2 be the extension of U↾ η determined by this branch, in other words determined by setting [0, η) U = c η .
If η = ω 1 then this assignment for U↾ η + 0.2 completes the construction of the items of conditions (A)-(C). We pass to the verification of victory by player I, starting with Claim 3.25 below.
Suppose then that η < ω 1 . We must continue with the construction of U↾ η + 1.2, w η , y η , and a η+1 , which are needed at the start of stage η + 1. We divide the construction of these objects into three cases. The first is similar to the case of successor and zero stages above, and results in a P η+1 which either extends P η or extends P γ for some limit γ ≤ η. The other two cases, which we handle later, are of a different nature.
Internal limit. If α → a α is constant on a tail-end of c η , and λ η (the relative domain of t η ) is not equal to j 0,η (θ).
Let ζ < η be large enough that α → a α is constant for α ∈ [ζ, η) U . Set a η = a ζ . Conditions (1)-(4) for η then follow from the fact that the same conditions hold for all α ∈ [ζ, η) U , and the facts that η is countable and M η (being a model on a tot consistent with the iteration strategy Γ) is wellfounded. The last two facts are needed to see that P ν(aη),η , which is equal to α∈[ζ,η) U P ν(aα),α , is not terminal through one of the snags (I3) and (I4) in [4, §6A] .
If η is a phantom limit in U then set T η equal to the trivial length ω iteration tree consisting entirely of padding, set b η to be the unique branch through this tree, and set E η ="undefined." These assignments determine U↾ η + 1.2 in such a way that M η+1 = M η and j η,η+1 = id. Notice that there is no need to define w η and y η in this case, since phantom limits are excluded from K U which is the domain of U-sequences. (See [4, §7B] for the relevant definitions.) Set a η+1 = a η . Conditions (1)-(3) for η + 1 then follow directly from the same conditions for η. The same is true of condition (4), since P ν(aη+1),η+1 here extends P ν(aη),η with just a trivial mega-round subject to the rules of the phantom limit case in [4, §6A] . Let us just note that the fact that P ν(aη+1),η+1 is non-terminal, which is needed for condition (4), uses the internal limit case assumption that λ η is not equal to j 0,η (θ). Without this assumption P ν(aη+1),η+1 would be terminal through the condition (P2) in [4, §6A] .
Suppose next that η is not a phantom limit. In other words suppose that η is a standard limit in U. So far we constructed U↾ η + 0.2 and a η , and secured conditions (1)-(4) for η. We proceed now to construct U↾ η + 1.2, w η , y η , and a η+1 , working along the lines of the successor and zero stages described above.
Let a denote a η and let ν denote ν(a η ). Σ branch (a)[P ν,η ] and the iteration strategy Γ combine to produce w η , T η , b η , and y η according to rules (L1)-(L4) of G branch in [4, §6A] . T η and b η determine U↾ η + 1, with a final model Q η . Working over Q η let t † η = t η − −, w η , y η . If t † η is obstruction free over Q η then let U↾ η + 1.2 be the extension of U↾ η + 1 determined by the assignment E η ="undefined." Let a η+1 = a (namely equal to a η ). With these assignments conditions (1)-(3) for η + 1 follow from the same conditions for η, secured above. Moreover an argument similar to that of [4, Lemma 7C.7] shows that P ν,η+1 is legal in G branch (M ν , t ν , j 0,ν (θ))(j 0,ν (Ẏ )(â)), non-terminal, and played according to Σ branch (a). This secures condition (4) for η + 1. Notice how the work here is similar to that in case 1 of the successor and zero stages above. Indeed the parallel constructions in [4] were combined into one case; [4, Lemma 7C.7] applies to both successors and standard limits.
If t † η is obstructed over Q η then by an argument similar to that of [4, Claim 7C.6] it must be I-acceptably obstructed. Let E, σ be a I-acceptable obstruction for t † η over Q η in this case. Let γ ≤ η be such that crit(E) is equal to λ γ . Let a * denote a γ and let ν * denote ν(a γ ). Let U↾ η + 1.2 be the extension of U↾ η + 1 determined by the assignments:
(a) E η = E; and (b) The U -predecessor of η + 1 is γ. Let a η+1 = a γ . Conditions (1)-(3) for η + 1 then follow from the same conditions for γ, and an argument similar to that of [4, Lemma 7C.13] shows that P ν * ,η+1 is legal in G branch (M ν * , t ν * , j 0,ν * (θ))(j 0,ν * (Ẏ )(â * )), non-terminal, and played according to Σ branch (a * ), thereby securing condition (4) for η + 1. Notice how the work here is similar to that in case 2 of the successor and zero stages above. Again the parallel constructions in [4] were in fact combined into one case; [4, Lemma 7C.13] applies to both successors and standard limits.
The descriptions above divide into three subcases: phantom limit; standard limit with t † η obstruction free over Q η ; and standard limit with t † η obstructed over Q η . In each of the subcases we constructed to the point of obtaining U↾ η + 1.2, w↾ η + 1, y↾ η + 1, a η , and a η + 1, and secured conditions (1)-(4) for η and η + 1. This puts us in the position necessary to pass to stage η +1. ⊣ (Internal limit.)
In both the construction for the successor and zero stages and the construction for internal limits we obtained the following condition for α = η + 1:
5. (If α is a successor.) Let ζ be the U -predecessor of α. Then crit(j ζ,α ) is greater than or equal to the relative domain of t ζ , with equality possible only if ζ is a limit. If t † η is obstruction free over Q η , the U -predecessor of η + 1 is η and j η,η+1 is the direct limit embedding along the branch b η of T η . Condition (5) for α = η + 1 follows from the restrictions in the rules of G branch , specifically rules (S3) and (L2) in [4, §6A] , which force T η to only use critical points strictly above rdm(t η ).
If t † η is obstructed over Q η , the U -predecessor of η + 1 is γ where γ is such that crit(E η ) = λ γ . γ is a limit in this case and j γ,η+1 is the ultrapower embedding of M γ by E η , so crit(j γ,η+1 ) = crit(E η ) = λ γ . Condition (5) for α = η + 1 follows from this since λ γ is equal to the relative domain of t γ by [4, Claim 7B.15 ]. Finally, if η is a phantom limit then j η,η+1 is the identity and condition (5) for α = η + 1 is taken to hold vacuously.
We intend to maintain condition (5) for η + 1 also in the case that η falls under the additional limit cases described below. Before proceeding with these limit cases let us establish some necessary claims. The claims assume conditions (1)- (5) for α < η, except that Claim 3.15 assumes condition (5) also for η, and Claim 3.16 assumes that a η is known and that conditions (3) and (5) hold true for η. In the case of condition (5) these extra assumptions are vacuous if η is a limit. (5) holds true for η.) Let ζ U η ≤ ω 1 . Then crit(j ζ,η ) ≥ rdm(t ζ ) with equality possible only if ζ is a limit.
Proof. Immediate using condition (5) on successor ordinals α so that α ∈ (ζ, η] U . ⊣ Claim 3.16. (Assuming that a η is known, and conditions (3) and (5) hold true for η.)â η is not moved by j ν(aη),η .
Proof. If a η = ∅ thenâ η = ∅ and the claim holds trivially. So suppose a η = ∅. ν(a η ) in this case is max(a η ) + 1 by definition. In particular it is a successor, and so crit(j ν(aη),η ) > rdm(t ν(aη) ) strictly by Claim 3.15.
Nowâ η consists of the ordinals rdm(t α ) for α ∈ a η . All these ordinals are smaller than or equal to rdm(t max(aη) ), which in turn is smaller than or equal to rdm(t max(aη)+1 ) = rdm(t ν(aη) ), which as we saw above is strictly below the critical point of j ν(aη),η . So the ordinals inâ η are not moved by j ν(aη),η , and it follows thatâ η too is not moved. ⊣ Claim 3.17. Let ζ be such that ζ + 1 < η. Then t ζ+1 is M ζ+1 -clear.
Proof. P ν(a ζ+1 ),ζ+1 is legal in an instance of G branch by condition (4). It's easy to see directly from Definition 3.12 that the outcome of P ζ+1 is equal to M ζ+1 , j ν(a ζ+1 ),ζ+1 , t ζ+1 . Using [4, Remark 6A.4] 
Proof. By Claim 3.17, t ζ+1 is M ζ+1 -clear for each ζ such that ζ + 1 < η and in particular for each ζ so that ζ + 1 ∈ [0, η) U . Since crit(j ζ+1,η ) ≥ rdm(t ζ+1 ) by Claim 3.15, t ζ+1 is also M η -clear. Since t η = ζ+1∈[0,η) U t ζ+1 for limit η it follows that t η is M η -clear. ⊣ Claim 3.19. Let ζ U η < ω 1 . Suppose that all limit stages in [ζ, η] U fall under the case of the internal limit above. Then a η = a ζ .
Proof. The claim assumes that for eachη + 1 ∈ [ζ, η] U , aη +1 is defined according to either the successor and zero construction or the terminal limit construction. Either way aη +1 is then equal to a ξ where ξ is the U -predecessor ofη + 1. Similarly for limitη ∈ [ζ, η] U the claim assumes that aη is defined according to the terminal limit construction. aη is then equal to a ξ for all sufficiently large ξ Uη. Now by induction onη it follows that aη = a ζ for all η ∈ [ζ, η] U , and in particular a η = a ζ . ⊣ Claim 3.20. Let ζ U η ≤ ω 1 , and let a equal a ζ . Suppose that η is a limit and λ η = j 0,η (θ). Suppose that t ζ belongs to an interpretation of j 0,ζ (Ẏ )(â) over M ζ . Then t η belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(â) over M η .
Proof. Roughly speaking this is simply a matter of rephrasing the fact that t ζ belongs to an interpretation of j 0,ζ (Ẏ )(â) as a statement over M ζ , and then using the elementarity of j ζ,η to transfer this statement to M η .
LetĊ denote j 0,ζ (Ẏ )(â).Ċ is a name for a set of j 0,ζ (θ)-sequences. Since t ζ belongs to an interpretation ofĊ it follows that t ζ is a j 0,ζ (θ)-sequence over M ζ . In other words t ζ is an By Claim 3.15, j ζ,η has critical point at least the relative domain of t ζ , which as we observed above is equal to j 0,ζ (θ). Conditions in j 0,ζ (W θ ) are elements of M ζ j 0,ζ (θ). So j ζ,η does not move conditions in j 0,ζ (W θ ), and in particular it does not move [σ] .
Let H be the filter associated to t η by [4 LetḊ denote j 0,η (Ẏ )(â). Note then thatḊ = j ζ,η (Ċ);â is not moved by j ζ,η , since the map has critical point at least rdm(t ζ ) by Claim 3.15, rdm(t ζ ) = j 0,ζ (θ) as we observed above, and the ordinals inâ are all below j 0,ν(a ζ ) (θ) and therefore certainly below j 0,ζ (θ), by condition (2).
Applying j ζ,η to the fact that [σ] j 0,ζ (W θ ) "ṫ ∈Ċ," and using the fact that [σ] is not moved by j ζ,η , we see that [σ] We return now to the construction in the case of limit η. We have U↾ η + 0.2, extending U↾ η in a manner consistent with the iteration strategy Γ. We know that conditions (1)- (5) hold true for α < η. c η denotes the branch [0, η) U picked by Γ for the extension to U↾ η + 0.2.
So far we handled the case that α → a α is constant on a tail-end of c η , and λ η is not equal to j 0,η (θ). We handle the remaining cases next.
Terminal limit. If α → a α is constant on a tail-end of c η , and λ η is equal to j 0,η (θ).
Let ζ < η be large enough that α → a α is constant for α ∈ [ζ, η) U . Set a η = a ζ . As in the case of the internal limit this secures conditions (1)- (4) for η. Condition (5) for η is vacuous since η is a limit.
Let a denote a η and let ν denote ν(a). Let θ ν denote j 0,ν (θ) and letẎ ν denote j 0,ν (Ẏ ). By condition (4), P ν,η is legal in G branch (M ν , t ν , θ ν )(Ẏ ν (â)), and played according to Σ branch (a). The outcome of P ν,η is equal to M η , j ν,η , t η . rdm(t η ) is equal to λ η which by the case assumption is equal to j 0,η (θ). In particular it follows that rdm(t η ) is Woodin in M η , so mega-round β = lh(P ν,η ) of G branch (M ν , t ν , θ ν )(Ẏ ν (â)) following P ν,η is played according to the rules of the phantom limit case in [4, §6A] .
Let P + be the one mega-round extension of P ν,η generated by the trivial moves of the phantom limit case. The settings in the phantom limit case are such that the outcome of P + is simply equal to the outcome of P ν,η , namely to M η , j ν,η , t η . (No moves are actually made in phantom limit cases, see [4, §6A] .) We saw above that rdm(t η ) = j 0,η (θ). In other words rdm(t η ) = j ν,η (θ ν ). It follows from this that P + is terminal in G branch (M ν , t ν , θ ν )(Ẏ ν (â)) through the payoff condition (P2) in [4, §6A] . P + , being consistent with Σ branch (a), must be won by player I. Looking at the payoff condition (P2) in [4, §6A] and folding into it the fact that the outcome of P + is M η , j ν,η , t η , we see that t η belongs to an interpretation of j ν,η (Ẏ ν (â)). By Claim 3.16â is not moved by j ν,η . So t η belongs to an interpretation of j ν,η (Ẏ ν )(â =â η ). In other words: ( * ) t η belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(â η ).
Remark 3.21. Condition ( * ) is in some sense the crux of the construction. It shows that we construct in a way that enters instances of shifts ofẎ determined by the assignment a → a α . The choices for this assignment (at least the crucial ones) will be made in the external limit case below. Combining these choices with condition ( * ) we will then show that the construction leads to a run of G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) which is won by player I.
Letη ≤ η be the least element of [0, η] U which falls under the conditions of the terminal limit case. (η may be equal to η, but it may also be smaller.)
By condition ( * ) forη, tη belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(âη). Using the choice ofη and instances of Claim 3.19 at and belowη, it is easy to check that aη is equal to a 0 , which was set equal to ∅. So tη belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(∅). Using now Claim 3.20 with ζ =η it follows that: (i) t η belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(∅). Remember that our goal is to bring the construction to the point necessary for passing to stage η + 1. We have to define U↾ η + 1.2, assign a value to a η+1 , and verify that conditions (1)- (5) hold true for η + 1 with the assignments made.
(There is no need to define w η and y η since η is a phantom limit in U, and therefore excluded from the domain of U-sequences.)
Let µ η denote j 0,η (µ M ) and let θ η denote j 0,η (θ). µ η is an external measure over M η , with critical point equal to θ η .
Set T η equal to the trivial length ω iteration tree which consists entirely of padding, and set b η equal to the unique branch through this tree. Set E η equal to µ η , and set the U -predecessor of η + 1 equal to η. These assignments determine U↾ η + 1.2, and do so in such a way that M η+1 = Ult(M η , µ η ) and j η,η+1 is the ultrapower embedding. t η+1 is equal to t η since η is a phantom limit in U.
Set a η+1 = η .â η+1 is then equal to rdm(t η ) . We noted above that rdm(t η ) = j 0,η (θ). Soâ η+1 = θ η .
Remark 3.22. In making the assignment a η+1 = η we use the assumption for convenience made in Remark 3.1. We need a η+1 ∈ [η + 1]
≤k , and for this we need k ≥ 1.
Let θ η+1 denote j 0,η+1 (θ). Working over M η and applying the second part of Claim 3.8 to condition (i) above we see that t η belongs to an interpretation of the (θ η , θ η+1 )-pullback of j 0,η+1 (Ẏ )(∅ ⌢ θ η ), where the pullback is computed in M η+1 . In other words t η+1 = t η belongs to an interpretation of the (θ η , θ η+1 )-pullback of j 0,η+1 (Ẏ )(â η+1 ), computed over M η+1 .
Using [4, Theorem 6G.1] it follows that player I has a winning strategy in G branch (M η+1 , t η+1 , θ η+1 )(j 0,η+1 (Ẏ )(â η+1 )). This secures condition (1) for η + 1. Conditions (2)-(5) for η + 1 can be verified directly from the assignments made above.
⊣ (Terminal limit.) We have still one limit case left to handle, the external limit case below. But first let us establish the following claims:
Claim 3.23. Let η ≤ ω 1 be a limit. Suppose that α → a α is not constant on any tail-end of [0, η) U . Let ζ belong to [0, η) U . Then there exists someη ∈ [ζ, η) U so thatη is a terminal limit.
Proof. Otherwise an induction using instances of Claim 3.19 shows that every limitη ∈ [ζ, η) U is internal, and that aη = a ζ for everyη ∈ [ζ, η) U . But this contradicts the assumption that α → a α is not constant on any tail-end of
Proof. Let I ⊂ [0, η) U be the set ofη ∈ [0, η) U which are terminal limits. By Claim 3.23, I is cofinal in η. The terminal limit case assumptions are such that λη = j 0,η (θ) for eachη ∈ I. crit(jη ,η ) is greater than or equal to λη by Claim 3.15. Combining all these facts it follows that j 0,η (θ) is equal to supη ∈I λη. This supremum is equal to λ sup(I)=η since the sequence λ α = rdm(t α ) | α ≤ ω 1 is continuous. ⊣ External limit. If α → a α is not constant on any tail-end of c η .
Begin by setting a η = ∅. There is not much significance to this assignment, since conditions (1)-(4) are not needed for external limit η, and condition (5) is vacuous. We must proceed to construct U↾ η + 1.2, and set value to a η+1 , in a way that secures conditions (1)- (5) for η + 1.
Let a ∈ [ω 1 ] <k be the unique tuple so that η ∈ S a . A tuple of this kind must exist because of the assumption made in Remark 3.2. There can only be one tuple of this kind since the sets in S are mutually disjoint.
We divide the construction for external limits into two cases, depending on whether a appears as an a ζ for some ζ ∈ c η = [0, η) U , or not.
Case 1. Suppose first that there exists some ζ ∈ [0, η) U so that a is equal to a ζ . Letη be the first terminal limit in [ζ, η) U . (A terminal limit of this kind must exist by Claim 3.23.) By Claim 3.19 onη, aη is equal to a ζ , which is equal to a. By condition ( * ) of the terminal limit case forη we have then:
(ii) tη belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(â). By Claim 3.24, λ η = j 0,η (θ). Applying Claim 3.20 (with the currentη standing for ζ of that claim) it follows from this and from condition (ii) that: (iii) t η belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(â).
From now on continue along the lines of the construction in the terminal limit case, from condition (i) onward, only setting a η+1 equal to a ⌢ η instead of ∅ ⌢ η , and using condition (iii) instead of condition (i). Except for these two changes the constructions are the same, and we therefore omit further details.
⊣ (Case 1.) Case 2. Suppose next that there is no ζ ∈ [0, η) U so that a is equal to a ζ . Letη be the first terminal limit in [0, η) U . (A terminal limit must exist in [0, η) U by Claim 3.23.) By Claim 3.19 onη, aη is equal to a 0 , which is equal to ∅. By condition ( * ) of the terminal limit case forη:
(iv) tη belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(∅). Using Claim 3.20 (with the currentη standing for ζ of that claim) it follows that: (v) t η belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(∅). This is the same as condition (i) in the construction for terminal limits. Continue by precisely following the construction there. ⊣ (Case 2.) For future reference let us record the following fact, which simply expresses the settings in case 1:
<k be such that η ∈ S a . If there exists some ζ ∈ [0, η) U so that a ζ = a then a η+1 is equal to a ⌢ η . Of the two cases above, case 1 is the more important. It aims to fit a η+1 with an element of [ S] . We shall see below that a fit is obtained sufficiently often to make sure that the set {a α | α < ω 1 } generated through the construction contains [ S] ∩ C for some C which is club in ω 1 .
⊣ (External limit.) The case of successor and zero stages above, and the three limit cases (internal, terminal, and external), complete the construction of the items in conditions (A)-(C) listed at the start of the proof of Lemma 3.6. Among other objects we constructed a run r ∈ ω ω1 , given by Definition 3.11. The odd half of r was created by the imaginary opponent. (This was done through the use of the imaginary opponent in the successor and zero stages.) The even half was created by the mechanisms of the construction.
The construction can thus be formalized into a strategy for I in the length ω 1 game of Diagram 1. It remains to verify that this strategy is winning for I in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). In other words it remains to verify that the run r obtained through the construction via Definition 3.11 is won by player I.
We show this through a series of claims. We work to produce a club C ⊂ ω 1 so that: every tuple a
k . The first property is obtained in Corollary 3.31. Its proof ultimately relies on condition (vi) in the external limit construction. The second property is (in essence) obtained in Claim 3.32. Its proof ultimately relies on condition ( * ) in the terminal limit construction and on the nature of the names given byẎ , specifically on the connection to ϕ in Definition 3.3. The two properties combined imply that (
k , showing that r is won by player I in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ).
, and letẎ ν denote j 0,ν (Ẏ ). By condition (4), P ν,α is legal and non-terminal in G branch (M ν , t ν , θ ν )(Ẏ ν (a)), and moreover played according to Σ branch (a), for each α ∈ [ζ, ω 1 ) U . Since P ν,ω1 is equal to α∈[ζ,ω1) U P ν,α , it follows that P ν,ω1 is legal in G branch (M ν , t ν , θ ν )(Ẏ ν (a)), and moreover played according to Σ branch (a). But P ν,ω1 has length ω 1 and is therefore lost by player I through the snag (I4) in [4, §6A] . This is a contradiction since Σ branch (a) is a winning strategy for I. ⊣ Claim 3.26. There is a set C 1 ⊂ [0, ω 1 ) U so that C 1 is club in ω 1 and every η ∈ C 1 is an external limit.
Proof. Let C 1 ⊂ [0, ω 1 ) U be a club so that for every η ∈ C 1 the function α → a α is not constant on any tail-end of [0, η) U . The existence of such a club follows directly from Claim 3.25 and the fact that [0, ω 1 ) U is club in ω 1 . Every η ∈ C 1 is an external limit directly by definition. ⊣ Claim 3.27. Let η + 1 < ω 1 . Let ζ be the U -predecessor of η + 1. Then at least one of the following possibilities holds:
1. ζ = η; or 2. λ ζ is a limit of Woodin cardinals in M ζ , but not itself Woodin.
Proof. In most cases of the construction we set the U -predecessor of η + 1 equal to η. The only exceptions were in the obstructed cases of the construction for successor and zero stages, and similarly in the obstructed cases of the construction for internal limits. In those cases the U -predecessor of η + 1 was set equal to an ordinal γ determined by the critical point appearing in an obstruction for t † η . It was observed there (see specifically case 2 in the construction for successor and zero stages) that λ γ is a limit of Woodin cardinals in Q η but not itself Woodin, and this yields condition (2) of the current claim. ⊣ Claim 3.28. Let ζ ∈ [0, ω 1 ) U be an external limit. Then the successor of ζ in [0, ω 1 ) U is ζ + 1.
Proof. Let η + 1 be the successor of ζ in [0, ω 1 ) U . Then the U -predecessor of η + 1 is ζ. Now apply Claim 3.27. The second condition of the claim cannot hold, since λ ζ for an external limit ζ is equal to j 0,ζ (θ) by Claim 3.24, and j 0,ζ (θ) is a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals in M ζ . Thus the second condition of the claim must hold. In other words η = ζ and η + 1-which by its very choice is the successor of ζ in [0, ω 1 ) U -is equal to ζ + 1. ⊣ Claim 3.29. Let η belong to C 1 . Then η + 1 belongs to [0, ω 1 ) U .
Proof. Membership in C 1 implies that η is an external limit and belongs to [0, ω 1 ) U . By the previous claim then, the successor of η in [0, ω 1 ) U is η + 1. In particular η + 1 belongs to [0, ω 1 ) U . ⊣ Let T denote the set:
In fact the definition of T is identical to that of [ S] in Definition 1.1, except that here we consider not just tuples of length k, but tuples of any length ≤ k. Proof. For a = ∅ the claim holds trivially since a 0 was set equal to ∅ at the start of the construction.
Fix l < k and suppose inductively that the claim holds for all a of length l. We prove that it holds for all a * of length l + 1. Fix a * ∈ T ∩ [C 1 ] ≤k of length l + 1. Let η = max(a * ). Let a = a * ↾ l. Then a * = a ⌢ η , and η ∈ S a for otherwise a * would not belong to T . We have
≤k and η ∈ C 1 . In particular η is an external limit. Let ν denote ν(a). By the inductive assumption the claim holds for a, and since a ∈ T ∩[C 1 ]
≤k it follows that ν belongs to [0, ω 1 ) U and a = a ν . In particular there exists some ζ ∈ [0, η) U so that a = a ζ . (Take ζ = ν.) Using now condition (vi) in the external limit case it follows that a η+1 = a ⌢ η . In other words a η+1 is equal to a * . We have η + 1 ∈ [0, ω 1 ) U by Claim 3.29 since η ∈ C 1 . We showed in the previous paragraph that a * = a η+1 . These two conclusions prove the current claim for a * since ν * = max(a * ) + 1 is simply η + 1. ⊣ Proof. Letη be the first terminal limit in [ζ, ω 1 ) U . Such a terminal limit must exist, since otherwise an induction using Claim 3.19 shows that a η = a ζ for all η ∈ [ζ, ω 1 ) U , contradicting Claim 3.25.
By condition ( * ) of the terminal limit construction forη, tη belongs to an interpretation of j 0,η (Ẏ )(âη). By Claims 3.25 and 3.24, λ ω1 = j 0,ω1 (θ). Using Claim 3.20 with η = ω 1 and the currentη standing for ζ of that claim, it follows from the conclusions of the last two sentences that t ω1 belongs to an interpretation of j 0,ω1 (Ẏ )(âη). By Claim 3.19 on ζ andη, aη is equal to a ζ . So t ω1 belongs to an interpretation of j 0,ω1 (Ẏ )(â ζ ).
The conclusion of the last paragraph holds for every ζ ∈ [0, ω 1 ) U , regardless of the length of a ζ . Ultimately it traces back to the construction for terminal limits, and most importantly to condition ( * ) of the terminal limit case.
Here we assume that a ζ is a tuple of length k. Membership in an interpretation of j 0,ω1 (Ẏ )(â ζ ) is thus the same as membership in an interpretation of j 0,ω1 (Ẏ k )(â ζ ) by condition (1) of Claim 3.8 (shifted to M ω1 ). So t ω1 belongs to an interpretation of j 0,ω1 (Ẏ k )(â ζ ). By Definition 3.3 this means that:
(α 0 , . . . , α k−1 here are the ordinals forming the tuple a ζ . Notice then thatâ ζ is equal to α 0 , . . . ,α k−1 .) j 0,ω1 (θ) is equal to λ ω1 by Claims 3.24 and 3.25, and λ ω1 = rdm(t ω1 ) is equal to ω 1 . r(t ω1 ) is the concatenation of the reals in z(t ω1 ), the real part of t ω1 . z(t ω1 ) is equal to y −1+ξ+1 | ξ < ω 1 by [4, Claim 7B.16]. The concatenation leading to r(t ω1 ) is therefore precisely the same as the concatenation leading to r in Definition 3.11. Substituting j 0,ω1 (θ) = ω 1 and r(t ω1 ) = r in the equation above we get:
Proof. Fix a club C 2 ⊂ ω 1 so thatα = α for every α ∈ C 2 . This is possible by Remark 3.13.
for each i = 0, . . . , k − 1 since each of the ordinals α i belongs to C, and therefore
⊣ Corollary 3.33 shows that r is won by player I in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). This completes the proof of Lemma 3.6.
⊣ (Lemma 3.6.) Lemma 3.6 provides a criterion for the existence of a winning strategy for I in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). We work now to mirror the lemma, and obtain a similar criterion for the existence of a winning strategy for II. Later on we shall see that at least one of criterions must hold.
For the sake of Definitions 3.34 and 3.35 fix some tuple α 0 , . . . , 
ψ ini here is the formula of [4, Definition 5G.2] . Notice how Definitions 3.34 through 3.36 precisely mirror Definitions 3.3 through 3.5. By mirroring precisely the argument of Lemma 3.6 we get:
k measure 1. Then player II has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). ⊣
To establish the determinacy of G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) it is now enough to prove that at least one of U (ϕ) and V (ϕ) has (µ M ) k measure 1.
Lemma 3.38. It cannot be that both U (ϕ) and
. Suppose for contradiction that both U * and V * have (µ M ) k measure 1. It follows in particular that their intersection is non-empty. Fix then a tuple α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ∈ U * ∩ V * . LetẎ i denoteẎ i (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ) and letŻ i denoteŻ i (α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ). The fact that α 0 , . . . , α k−1 belongs to neither U (ϕ) nor V (ϕ) means that: [4, Corollary 5G.3] it follows that there exists a supernice, saturated α 0 -sequence t 0 over M which avoidsẎ 0 andŻ 0 . Inductive applications of [4, Theorem 5G.1] then produce supernice, saturated α i+1 -sequences t i+1 for i < k so that each t i+1 extends t i and avoidsẎ i+1 andŻ i+1 . This ultimately results in a θ-sequence t k which avoidsẎ k andŻ k , meaning that there is some
But this is a contradiction sinceẎ k andŻ k by definition name complementary sets of θ-sequences. ⊣ Theorem 3.39.
<k be a sequence of mutually disjoint subsets of ω 1 . Let ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) be a formula of L + . Then the game G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) is determined.
Proof. Suppose first that k ≥ 1. The theorem is then an immediate consequence of Lemmas 3.6, 3.37, and 3.38. If U (ϕ) has (µ M ) k measure 1 then player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) by Lemma 3.6. If V (ϕ) has (µ M ) k measure 1 then player II has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) by Lemma 3.37. At least one of these cases must hold by Lemma 3.38.
The restriction to k ≥ 1 in the previous paragraph has to do with the assumption for convenience in Remark 3.1. Let us next derive determinacy in the case k = 0 from determinacy in the case k = 1. This is a simple matter of adding a dummy variable to ϕ, and making a slight adjustment to S. Suppose k = 0. Let S ∅ = ω 1 , and let S * = S ∅ . Let ϕ * (x 0 ) = ϕ. (That is let ϕ * be obtained by adding a dummy variable x 0 to ϕ.) The games G ω1,1 ( S * , ϕ * ) and G ω1,0 ( S, ϕ) are then precisely the same, and the determinacy of the latter follows from the determinacy of the former, established in the previous paragraph. ⊣ Remark 3.40. We do not need the actual fine structural mouse 0 W for Theorem 3.39, only its large cardinal strength. The theorem holds under the coarse assumption that there exists a pair M, µ M satisfying conditions (A1)-(A4) at the start of this section. §4. Definability. We work now to reduce statements involving ω1 to statements about 0 W . Let M 0 = 0 W and let µ 0 be the top extender of 0 W . Let M ξ , j ζ,ξ | ζ ≤ ξ ∈ On be the iteration determined by letting M ξ+1 = Ult(M ξ , µ ξ ) where µ ξ = j 0,ξ (µ 0 ); letting j ξ,ξ+1 : M ξ → M ξ+1 be the ultrapower embedding by µ ξ ; defining the remaining embeddings by compositions; and taking direct limits at limit stages. Let κ ξ = crit(µ ξ ) = j 0,ξ (κ 0 ). Let N be the direct limit of the (class) system M ξ , j ζ,ξ | ζ ≤ ξ ∈ On , cut to height On. This is the class model defined in Section 2, and the theory of k Woodin indiscernibles defined there is the theory of κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 in N .
Let M = M 1 κ 1 . Fix k < ω. Let χ be the formula of Remark 3.7. This is the formula which defines the function ϕ → U (ϕ) of Definition 3.5. The following is a summary of the properties of χ and the map ϕ → U (ϕ), taken from Section 3, needed for the definability results below.
•
k measure 1, then player I has a winning strategy in the game G ω1,k ( S, ϕ).
• If U (ϕ) does not have (µ 0 ) k measure 1, then player II has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ).
Precise references for the proofs of these properties are given as they are used, in the proof of the next lemma. (The proof of the second property takes the bulk of Section 3.)
<k be a collection of mutually disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 . Let ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) be a formula of L + . Then player I wins G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) iff N |="(∀X) (χ(κ k , ϕ, X) → κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 ∈ X)."
Proof. Let M, µ M be the pair M 1 κ 1 , µ 0 , that is the pair consisting of the top extender of 0 W , and an initial segment of the ultrapower of 0 W by its top extender. Note that M, µ M then satisfies conditions (A1)-(A4) of Section 3. We work now with the results of that section, applied specifically to this particular pair.
Let U (ϕ) be given by Definition 3.5 (applied on the pair M, µ M given by
Applying to this the elementary embedding j 0,k we see that j 0,k (U (ϕ)) is the unique X ∈ M k+1 κ k+1 so that (M k+1 κ k+1 ) |= χ[κ k , ϕ, X]. Applying next the embedding j k+1,∞ it follows that:
." Using condition (i) it follows that κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 belongs to j 0,k (U (ϕ)). From this it follows that U (ϕ) has (µ 0 ) k measure 1. Using Lemma 3.6 it follows that player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ), as required.
Suppose next that N |="(∀X) (χ(κ k , ϕ, X) → κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 ∈ X)." Using condition (i) it follows that κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 does not belong to j 0,k (U (ϕ)), and from this it follows that U (ϕ) has (µ 0 ) k measure 0. By Lemma 3.38, V (ϕ) has (µ 0 ) k measure 1. By Lemma 3.37 then player II has a winning strategy in
<k ) are assumed here to all be stationary, it cannot be that both I and II win G ω1,k ( S, ϕ). So player I does not have a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ), as required. ⊣ 
<k each be a collection of mutually disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 . Then player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) iff she has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S * , ϕ).
Proof. Simply note that player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) iff N |="(∀X) (χ(κ k , ϕ, X) → κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 ∈ X)" iff player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S * , ϕ). Each of the equivalences follows by an application of Lemma 4.1, the first with S and the second with S * . ⊣ Corollary 4.2 is needed to make sense of the game quantifier ω1,k (ϕ) of Section 1. Having made sense of the game quantifier we can use Lemma 4.1 further, to complete the connection between ω1 and 0 W discussed in Section 2. Recall that Φ k denotes the set of formulae, in the language L + of Section 1, with at most k free variables. Recall that T k denotes the theory of k indiscernible Woodin cardinals, that is the theory of κ 0 , . . . , κ k−1 in the model N defined above.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4.1, since the question of whether or not Proof. This is just the combination of Theorem 2.13, Theorem 4.3, and Claim 2.2. ⊣ We pass now to the specific case of k = 0 and ϕ in Σ 1 . Fix a Σ 1 sentence ϕ in L + . (Let us emphasize the fact that we are working with the case k = 0, and ϕ has no free variables.) Let ϕ * (x 0 ) denote ϕ with a dummy variable x 0 added. Let S ∅ = ω 1 and let S * = S ∅ . Notice then that G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ) is precisely the same game as G ω1,1 ( S * , ϕ * ). Lemma 4.6. Suppose there exist some iterable, countable model M and some
Proof. Fix M , α 0 , and α 1 as in the claim. Fix an iteration strategy Γ for M . Working with an imaginary opponent who plays for II in G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ), construct a regular tot U on M of length γ + 0.2 for some γ < ω 1 , and a U-sequence w ξ , y ξ | ξ ∈ K U , so that:
(i) U is consistent with Γ (in particular all models of U are wellfounded); and (ii) The final annotated position t η induced by U and w, y belongs to an interpretation of j 0,γ (Ẏ * 1 (α 0 , α 1 )). The construction is an application of the methods of [4, Chapters 6, 7] and some elements in the proof of Lemma 3.6, using the fact that
We leave the exact details to the pleasure of the reader. Letr = r(t γ ). This is the concatenated real part of the annotated position t γ induced by U and w, y . Let β = lh(r). Notice that β is countable, since U has countable length. From condition (ii) and the definition ofẎ * 1 it follows that: (iii) (L β [r];r) |= ϕ.
r was produced through a construction involving an imaginary opponent playing for II in G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ). The opponent contributed the odd half ofr and the mechanism of the construction gave rise to the even half.
Continue now to construct and extendr to a full run r ∈ ω ω1 of G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ). Let the imaginary opponent play the odd half of the extension, that is the moves r(ξ) for odd ξ ≥ β. For the even half play always r(ξ) = 0.
Since ϕ is Σ 1 , condition (iii) and the fact that r extendsr imply that (L ω1 [r]; r) satisfies ϕ. So r is won by player I in G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ), as required. ⊣ Remark 4.7. The end argument in the proof of Lemma 4.6 illustrates the fact that G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ) in the case of a Σ 1 sentence ϕ is an open game of length ω 1 . Victory for player I is secured already at the initial stager, and the subsequent moves are irrelevant. 
Proof. Following the notation in Section 3 let θ = crit(µ M ). The assumption of the current lemma, taken with α 1 = θ, in particular implies that {α 0 < θ | M |= ϕ ini [α 0 ,Ẏ * 0 (α 0 , α 1 )]} is empty. Notice that this is precisely the set U (ϕ * ) of Definition 3.5, applied over M with k = 1 and with the formula ϕ * obtained by adding a dummy variable to ϕ. The fact that this set is empty certainly implies that it has µ M measure 0. Using Lemmas 3.38 and 3.37 it follows that player II has a winning strategy in G ω1,1 ( S * , ϕ * ). We noted above that this game is precisely the same as G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ) . ⊣ Corollary 4.9. (Assuming 0 W exists and letting N be the result of iterating the top extender of 0 W through the ordinals.) Player I wins G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ) iff there exists some initial segment M of N , and some α 0 < α 1 in M so that M |= ϕ ini [α 0 ,Ẏ 0 (α 0 , α 1 )].
Proof. Recall that M ξ , j ζ,ξ | ζ ≤ ξ ∈ On is the transfinite iteration leading to N . M 0 is 0 W and µ 0 is the top extender of 0 W . M ξ+1 and j ξ,ξ+1 are always obtained through an ultrapower by µ ξ = j 0,ξ (µ 0 ), and N is the direct limit of the entire system. Recall that κ ξ denotes the critical point of µ ξ . We noted in the proof of Lemma 4.1 that the pair M 1 κ 1 , µ 0 satisfies assumptions (A1)-(A4) of Section 1.
Suppose first that there are no M , α 0 , and α 1 as in the corollary. Taking M = M 1 κ 1 it follows in particular that there are no α 0 < α 1 ∈ M 1 κ 1 so that (M 1 κ 1 ) |= ϕ ini [α 0 ,Ẏ 0 (α 0 , α 1 )]. Applying Lemma 4.8 with the pair M 1 κ 1 , µ 0 it follows that player II has a winning strategy in G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ), and therefore player I does not.
Suppose next that there are M , α 0 , and α 1 as in the corollary. Using the elementarity of j 1,∞ , which embeds M 1 κ 1 into N , it follows that there exist M , α 0 , and α 1 as in the corollary with the additional property that M is an initial segment of M 1 κ 1 . In particular then M is countable and iterable. Applying Lemma 4.6 to M , α 0 , and α 1 , it follows that player I wins G ω1,0 (∅, ϕ). ⊣ Recall that T Σ1 denotes the Σ 1 theory of N (with no parameters) and Φ Σ1 denotes the set of Σ 1 sentences in L + . In Section 2 we saw that T Σ1 is recursive in ω1 Φ Σ1 . We can now establish the reverse direction: The following is a sketch of the relevant part of Woodin's argument. For a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals δ, let P δ be the poset adding a sequence of reals x ξ | ξ < δ generic over the sequence of extenders algebras at Woodin cardinals below δ, and a strategy σ generic for the extender algebra at δ, acting on countable length plays coded by reals in {x ξ | ξ < δ}. Let ψ A state that there is some δ so that, in the extension by P δ , σ is forced to not be winning for the closed player in open−ω1 (A), meaning that there is a play coded by some x ξ which defeats σ. It is easy to see that if N |= ψ A then in V the closed player does not have a winning strategy in open−ω1 (A): assuming there is such a strategy, iterate to make it-or more precisely its restriction to the plays appearing in the extension-generic, and obtain a contradiction. Conversely, suppose N |= ψ A , and let δ be an indiscernible Woodin cardinal of N . Work with P δ . Fix a condition p forcing σ to be winning for the closed player against plays coded by reals in {x ξ | ξ < δ}. Now play for the closed player by following an interpretation of σ, below the condition p, in iterates making all initial segments of the opponent's play generic. The measure on δ allows continuing this process to ω 1 , progressively fixing more of the interpretation of σ as the game and the iteration proceed.)
We finish this section with a note on the definability of the winning strategies constructed in Section 3. Given an iteration strategy Γ let Γ c be the restriction of Γ to countable iteration trees. Let Γ ω1 be the restriction of Γ to trees of length ω 1 . The proof of Lemma 3.6 refers to an iteration strategy Γ for M, µ M . The proof can be viewed as converting Γ c into a strategy for I in G ω1,k ( S, ϕ), and then using Γ ω1 to obtain the club that witnesses victory for I in the game. (The club C in Corollary 3.33 is essentially the branch [0, ω 1 ) U given by Γ ω1 , only thinned to the set of external limits, and then thinned further to the set of fixed points of the map α →α.) The first part of this observation can be formalized to Lemma 4.12 below.
By a pseudo-strategy for player I in a game of length ω 1 we mean a function Σ * defined on pairs p, w so that p is a position in the game where it is I's turn to play, and w is a wellordering of order type lh(p) on a subset of ω. Informally we think of Σ * as providing moves for I granted codes for countable ordinals. A run r of the game is consistent with the pseudo-strategy Σ * if there is a sequence w ξ | ξ < ω 1 so that r(ξ) = Σ * (r↾ ξ, w ξ ) for each ξ so that it is I's turn to move following r↾ ξ. A winning pseudo-strategy for player I is a pseudo strategy Σ * so that all runs consistent with Σ * are won by I. The corresponding notions for II are defined similarly. <k be a sequence of mutually disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 , and let S be the set of reals which code tuples ξ, a so that ξ ∈ S a .
Let ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) be a formula of L + . Then the player who wins G ω1,k ( S, ϕ) has a winning pseudo-strategy in the pointclass ∆ number of free variables in ϕ. Given a set A ⊂ Φ × R define ω1 A to be { ϕ, x ∈ A | ω1 (ϕ, x) = True}. Next we consider allowing reference to a set of hereditarily countable objects, that is to a subset of H(ω 1 ).
Fix A ⊂ H(ω 1 ). By L Let M be a model of ZFC * . Let θ be a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals in M . LetḂ be a W θ -name in M .Ḃ is said to capture A over M just in case thatḂ[G] = A ∩ M [G] for every G ∈ V which is W θ -generic over M . This is an adaptation to our context of the notion of capturing due to Woodin, tracing back to his core model induction. The related definitions below similarly adapt notions due to Woodin.
Let Γ be an iteration strategy for M .Ḃ is said to capture A over (M, Γ) just in case that j(Ḃ) captures A over M * for every iteration j : M → M * consistent with Γ and so that j(θ) ≤ ω 1 .
If µ M is an external measure over M and Γ is an iteration strategy for M, µ M , then we say thatḂ captures A over ( M, µ M , Γ) just in case that the condition of the previous paragraph holds, only allowing now uses in j of images of µ M , in addition to uses of internal extenders.
We say that A can be captured over (M, Γ) if there is a nameḂ in M which captures A over (M, Γ), and similarly for ( M, µ M , Γ).
The following result relativizes Theorem 3.39 and Corollary 4.2 to the games of Definition 5.2. Then the games G ω1,k ( S, A, ϕ) are determined. Moreover the question of which player has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, A, ϕ) is independent of S. ⊣
The final clause in Theorem 5.3 allows defining a relativized game quantifier in the natural manner: ω1,k (A, ϕ) is "True" iff player I has a winning strategy in G ω1,k ( S, A, ϕ) for some/all S. As usual define then ω1 (A, ϕ) to stand for One can of course combine Definitions 5.1 and 5.2, to phrase the games G ω1,k ( S, A, ϕ, x) with reference to both a set A ⊂ H(ω 1 ) and a real x, and to phrase the corresponding game quantifier ω1 (A, ϕ, x) .
